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Abstract—Proliferation of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin) that
allow pseudo-anonymous transactions, has made it easier for ran-
somware developers to demand ransom by encrypting sensitive
user data. The recently revealed strikes of ransomware attacks
have already resulted in significant economic losses and societal
harm across different sectors, ranging from local governments to
health care.
Most modern ransomware use Bitcoin for payments. However,
although Bitcoin transactions are permanently recorded and
publicly available, current approaches for detecting ransomware
depend only on a couple of heuristics and/or tedious information
gathering steps (e.g., running ransomware to collect ransomware
related Bitcoin addresses). To our knowledge, none of the previous
approaches have employed advanced data analytics techniques
to automatically detect ransomware related transactions and
malicious Bitcoin addresses.
By capitalizing on the recent advances in topological data
analysis, we propose an efficient and tractable data analytics
framework to automatically detect new malicious addresses in
a ransomware family, given only a limited records of previous
transactions. Furthermore, our proposed techniques exhibit high
utility to detect the emergence of new ransomware families,
that is, ransomware with no previous records of transactions.
Using the existing known ransomware data sets, we show that
our proposed methodology provides significant improvements
in precision and recall for ransomware transaction detection,
compared to existing heuristic based approaches, and can be
utilized to automate ransomware detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
This decade has been marked with the rise of blockchain
based technologies. In its core, blockchain is a distributed
public ledger that stores transactions between two parties
without requiring a trusted central authority. On a blockchain,
two unacquainted parties can create an immutable transaction
that is permanently recorded on the ledger to be seen by the
public. One of the first applications of Blockchain has been
the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [27]. Bitcoin’s success has ushered
an age known as the Blockchain 1.0 [37], and currently there
exist more than 1000 Blockchain based cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin transactions can be created anonymously, and
participation in the network does not require identity verifi-
cation. A payment can be requested by delivering a public
Bitcoin address (i.e., a short string) to a sender by using
anonymity networks such as Tor [10]. This ease of usage
and worldwide transaction availability of Bitcoin have been
noticed by malicious actors as well. The pseudo-anonymity of
cryptocurrencies has attracted the interest of a diverse body
of criminals, transnational terrorist groups, and illicit users.
Cryptocurrency related crime and, more generally, criminal
abuse of blockchain technologies are nowadays recognized as
the fastest-growing type of cybercrime [18], [31].
Among the malicious usage of cryptocurrencies, ran-
somware payments continue to attract an ever increasing atten-
tion. Although encrypting files and resources for ransom has
a long history, receiving ransom payments securely had never
been simple until the emergence of Bitcoin. For example, in
1989 the first documented ransomware AIDS Trojan demanded
payments via international money order or cashiers check sent
to a P.O. box in Panama. Worldwide transactability of Bitcoin
protects ransomware operators from revealing their identity to
collect the payments. As Paquet-Clouston et al. [30] state,
“The combination of strong and well-implemented crypto-
graphic techniques to take files hostage, the Tor protocol to
communicate anonymously, and the use of a cryptocurrency
to receive unmediated payments provide altogether a high
level of impunity for ransomware attackers”. Starting with
CryptoLocker in 2013, the world has seen an explosion of
ransomware that uses Bitcoin. Many organizations that have
been hit by ransomware are asked to pay significant amounts
using Bitcoin. For example, Jackson County, Georgia hit with
Ryuk in March, 2019 needed to pay bitcoins equal to $400,000,
since attackers also compromised the backup data [7].
Furthermore, using cryptocurrenies for ransomware pay-
ments appears to be substantially more prevalent than have
been previously realized. As noted by Hernendex-Castro et
al. [15], among the respondents to their survey, “the prevalence
of the Cryptolocker ransomware (3.4%) seems much higher
than expected. The proportion of Cryptolocker victims that
claim to have agreed to pay the ransom to recover their
files (41%) seems to be much larger than expected (3%
was conjectured by Symantec, 0.4% by Dell SecureWorks)”.
Hence, understanding the ransomware payments and its overall
economical impact is an emerging challenge of critical societal
importance.
Although there have been efforts to analyze the cryptocur-
rency transactions such as Bitcoin using various heuristics
(e.g., ”co-spending” heuristic that is based on the idea that
input addresses to the same transaction must belong to the
same person since private keys associated with those accounts
are needed for creating valid transactions [26]) to detect
ransomware payments, to our knowledge, none of the previous
efforts has leveraged advanced data science tools to detect
malicious ransomware payments.
In this paper, our goal is to identify Bitcoin addresses
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that are used to store and trade Bitcoins gained through
ransomware activities. To achieve this goal, we propose a
scalable data-driven Bitcoin transaction analytics framework
which is substantially more effective in detecting ransomware
payment related addresses, compared to the existing heuristic
based approaches.
The key thrust behind our proposed approach is the intrin-
sic capability to observe the complete blockchain graph and,
as a result, to track and analyze dynamics of the associated
blockchain topological and geometrical properties at a multi-
resolution level. A natural question arises: What does local
topological blockchain graph structure tells us on anomalous
and malicious patterns? For example, does a suspiciously
repeating occurrence of a certain blockchain payment pattern
tend to be associated with ransomware payment behavior? We
show that by using local topological information available on
the Bitcoin transaction graph, we can achieve significant im-
provement in detecting malicious Bitcoin addresses associated
with ransomware payments.
Significance of our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• To our knowledge, this is the first project that leverages
advanced data analytics and machine learning techniques
for ransomware related bitcoin address detection.
• We propose a simple, tractable and computationally ef-
ficient framework to extract features related to Bitcoin
transactions which exhibit high utility in predicting ran-
somware related activities.
• Using the ground truth data collected by various studies,
we develop a novel topological data analysis (TDA) based
ransomware detection approach that delivers significantly
higher precision and recall compared to existing heuristic
based procedures.
• In addition to detecting new addresses associated with
a known ransomware family, we show that our new
methodology could be used to detect the emergence of
new ransomware families.
II. RELATED WORK
The success of Bitcoin [27] has encouraged hundreds of
similar digital coins [39]. The underlying Blockchain technol-
ogy has been adopted in many use cases and applications.
With this rapidly increasing activity, there have been numerous
studies analyzing the blockchain technology from different
perspectives.
The earliest results aimed at tracking the transaction net-
work to locate coins used in illegal activities, such as money
laundering and blackmailing [3], [29]. These findings are
known as the taint analysis [9].
Bitcoin provides pseudo-anonymity; although all transac-
tions are public by nature, user identification is not required
to join the network. Mixing schemes [24], [33] exist to hide
the flow of coins in the network. Research articles have
shown that some Bitcoin payments can be traced [26]. As a
result, obfuscation efforts [28] by malicious users have become
increasingly sophisticated.
In ransomware analysis, Montreal [30], Princeton [17] and
Padua [8] studies have analyzed networks of cryptocurrency
ransomware, and found that hacker behavior can help us
identify undisclosed ransomware payments. Datasets of these
three studies are publicly available.
Early studies in ransomware detection use decision rules
on amounts and times of known ransomware transactions to
locate undisclosed ransomware (CryptoLocker) payments [19].
More recent studies are joint efforts between researchers and
blockchain analytics companies; Huang et al. identify shared
hacker behavior and use heuristics to identify ransomware
payments [17]. The authors estimate that 20000 victims have
made ransomware payments. However, these studies do not
extract features and build machine learning models to detect
ransomware payments and families.
Feature extraction has been studied for ransomware detec-
tion in specific domains. In software code analysis, Cryptolock
inspects ransomware programs and their activity for malicious
characteristics [34]. In this line of work, studies on ransomware
for mobile devices extract software code features to catch
malicious programs [23], [2]. However, these studies are
mainly targeted for detecting ransomware before it can infect
a system, and do not consider Bitcoin transactions.
III. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Ransomware
Ransomware is a type of malware that infects a victim’s
data and resources, and demands ransom to release them. In
two main types, ransomware can lock access to resources
or encrypt their content. In addition to computer systems,
ransomware can also infect IoT and mobile devices [23].
Ransomware can be delivered via email attachments or
web based vulnerabilities. More recently, ransomware have
been delivered via mass exploits. For example, CryptoLocker
used Gameover ZeuS botnet to spread through spam emails.
Once the ransomware is installed, it communicates with a
command and control center. Although earlier ransomware
used hard-coded IPs and domain names, newer variants may
use anonymity networks, such as TOR, to reach a hidden
command and control server.
In the case of asymmetric encryption, the encryption key
is delivered to the victim’s machine. In some variants, the
encryption key is created on the victim’s machine and delivered
to the command center.
Once resources are locked or encrypted, the ransomware
displays a message that asks a certain amount of bitcoins to
be sent to a bitcoin address. This amount may depend on the
number and size of the encrypted resources. After payment, a
decryption tool is delivered to the victim. However, in some
cases, such as with WannaCry, the ransomware contained a
bug that made it impossible to identify who paid a ransomware
amount.
B. Bitcoin Graph Model
Largely rooted in the existing network analysis method-
ology, earlier Bitcoin data analytics techniques approached
Bitcoin data by creating a graph that employs only a single type
of node. Such analytic procedures are referred to as transaction
and address graph approaches.
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In the transaction graph approach, addresses are ignored
and edges are created among transaction nodes [12], [32].
Naturally, the transaction graph is acyclic and a transaction
node cannot have new edges in the future.
In the address graph approach [36], transactions are ig-
nored and edges are created among address nodes. However,
Bitcoin does not store input to output coin flows explicitly –
all inputs are gathered at the transaction, and directed to output
addresses at once. As a result, inputs of a transaction must be
connected to all its output addresses, which may create large
cliques if too many addresses are involved in a transaction.
Single node type approaches do not provide a faithful
representation of the Blockchain data. The loss of information
about addresses or transactions seem to have an impact in
predictive models [14], [1]. In contrast, we model the Bitcoin
graph as a heterogeneous network with two node types:
addresses and transactions.
Bitcoin Graph Model We consider a directed weighted
graph G = (V,E,B) created from a set of transactions TX
and input and output addresses contained in TX . On G, V
is a set of nodes, and E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges.
B = {Address,Transaction} represents the set of node types.
For any node u ∈ V , it has a node type φ(u) ∈ B. For
each edge eu,v ∈ E between adjacent nodes u and v, we
have φ(u) 6= φ(v), and either φ(u) = {Transaction} or
φ(v) = {Transaction}. That is, an edge e ∈ E represents a
coin transfer between an address node and a transaction node.
This heterogeneous graph model subsumes the homogeneous
case (i.e., |B| = 1), where only transaction or address nodes
are used, and edges link nodes of the same type. Here, we
focus on the case where each address node is linked (i.e.,
input or output address of a transaction) via a transaction
node to another address node. We use Γia and Γ
o
a to refer
to predecessors (in-neighbors) and successors (out-neighbors)
of an address a, respectively.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we state the following five questions to
analyze ransomware behavior on the Bitcoin blockchain: 1 -
What features extracted from the Bitcoin network can be used
to detect ransomware behavior? 2 - Does a given ransomware
family (e.g., Cryptolocker) show the same behavior on the
Bitcoin blockchain over time? 3 - How similar is the behavior
of different ransomware operators on the Bitcoin blockchain?
4 - Can we detect Bitcoin ransom payments that are not
reported to law agencies or Blockchain Analytics companies?
5 - Based on the information about existing ransomware
families at a given time, can we detect the emergence of a
new ransomware on the Bitcoin blockchain?
To address questions 1 - 5 , we formulate two primary
research problems: i) detecting undisclosed payments to ad-
dresses that belong to a known ransomware family and ii)
predicting the emergence of a ransomware family unknown
to the date. We start by stating the notations used in our
problem definitions. Symbols used in this manuscript are given
in Tab. X.
Let {au}u∈Z+ be a set of addresses, and let each address
au be associated with a pair (~xu, yu), where ~xu ∈ RD is a
vector of its features and yu is its label. That is, depending
on a setting, yu can designate a white (i.e., non-ransomware)
address or a ransomware address. Furthermore, we associate
timestamp tu to represent the time when the address au first
appeared in a blockchain transaction. An address can appear
in the blockchain multiple times. Let f1, . . . , fn be labels of
known ransomware families (see Table XI) which have been
observed until time point t, and let f0 be a label of addresses
which are not known to belong to any ransomware family and
are assumed to be white addresses. Before time point t, if
we observe l addresses a1, . . . , al, then we form their D × l-
matrix of features Xt = {~x1, . . . , ~xl} and a vector of labels
Yt = {y1, . . . , yl} ∈ {f0, f1, . . . , fn}.
We formally define our research problems as follows:
Problem 1 [Existing Family Detection]: Let rs be a known
ransomware family of interest. Let Y˜t ⊆ Yt be such that ∀yj ∈
Y˜t, yj ∈ {f0, frs} and X˜t ⊆ Xt be the corresponding matrix
of features. (If at time point t, Y˜t ∩{frs} = ∅, increase t such
that Y˜t contains at least one frs.) Now, let {al+1, . . . , al+z} be
a set of addresses whose set of labels Yt′ = {yl+1, . . . , yl+z}
is unknown, and let Xt′ = {~xl+1, . . . , ~xl+z} be a set of
their corresponding observed features. Furthermore, let t′ > t,
and t < min{tal+1 , . . . , tal+z}. The problem is to predict all
addresses am ∈ {al+1, . . . , al+z} such that ym = frs, using
their currently available set of features Xt′ and previous history
(Xt, Yt).
Problem 2 [New Family Prediction]: Let rs′ be a new,
yet unobserved ransomware family, and frs′ be its label.
Let (Xt, Yt) be a pair of the sets of features and labels,
respectively, such that at time point t, ∀yj ∈ Yt, yj 6= frs′ .
Now, let {al+1, . . . , al+z} be a set of addresses whose set
of labels Yt′ = {yl+1, . . . , yl+z} is unknown, and let Xt′ =
{~xl+1, . . . , ~xl+z} be a set of their corresponding observed fea-
tures. Furthermore, let t′ > t, and t < min{tal+1 , . . . , tal+z}.
The problem is to predict all addresses am ∈ {al+1, . . . , al+z}
such that ym /∈ {f0, f1, . . . , fn} and am is associated with the
new ransomware rs (i.e., ym = frs′ ), using their currently
available set of features Xt′ and previous history (Xt, Yt).
A. Graph features for classification
On the heterogeneous Bitcoin network, the in-neighbors Γin
of a transaction txn is defined as the set of transactions (not
addresses) whose one or more outputs are input to transaction
txn. The out-neighbors of txn are denoted as Γon.
A transaction has inputs and outputs; the sum of out-
put amounts of a transaction txn is defined as Ao(n) =∑
au∈Γon
Aou(n), where an output address au receives A
o
u(n)
coins.
On the Bitcoin network, an address may appear multiple
times with different inputs and outputs. An address u that
appears in a transaction at time t can be denoted as atu. As
most addresses appear only once, for sake of simplicity, we
omit t throughout our notations when it is clear from the
context. In order to mine address behavior in time, we divide
the Bitcoin network into 24 hour long windows by using the
UTC-6 timezone as reference. This window approach serves
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Fig. 1: A toy network of 10 addresses and 7 transactions.
Dashed edges indicate transaction outputs from earlier win-
dows; t1, t3, t4 and t5 are starter transactions. Coin amounts
are shown on edges. Transaction outputs are equal to transac-
tion inputs, i.e., transaction fees are 0.
two purposes. First, the induced 24 hour network allows us to
capture how fast a given coin moves in the network. The speed
is measured by the number of blocks in a the 24 hour window
that contain a transaction involving the coin. In maximum, a
coin can appear in 144 blocks (24 hours, 6 blocks per hour).
Coin speed may disclose certain information on transaction
intent. For example, coins that are moved too frequently in
the network may be involved in money laundering. Second,
the temporal order of transactions within the window helps
us distinguish transaction activity from different geolocations.
Temporal information of transactions, such as the local time,
has been found useful to cluster criminal transactions (see
Figure 7 in [17]).
On the heterogeneous Bitcoin network, in each snapshot
we extract the following six features for an address: income,
neighbors, weight, length, count, loop.
Income of an address u is the total amount of coins output to
u: Iu =
∑
tn∈Γou
Aou(n).
Neighbors of an address u is the number of transactions which
have u as one of its output addresses:
∣∣Γiu∣∣.
We define the next four address features by using their
time ordered position in the defined 24 hour time window.
We denote time of a window with the earliest time t of
transactions contained in it. For each window, we first locate
the set of transactions that do not receive outputs from any
earlier transaction within the studied window t, i.e., TX =
{∀txn ∈ TX, s.t.,Γin = {at
0
1 , . . . , a
tn
z }, t0 ≤ tn < t}. These
transactions consume outputs of transactions that have been
generated in previous windows. For simplicity, we refer to a
transaction tx ∈ TX as a starter transaction.
Weight of an address u, Wu, is defined as the sum of fraction
of coins that originate from a starter transaction and reach u.
Length of an address u, Lu, is the number of non-starter
transactions on its longest chain, where a chain is defined as an
acyclic directed path originating from any starter transaction
and ending at address u. A length of zero implies that the
address is an output address of a starter transaction.
Count of an address u, Cu is the number of starter transactions
which are connected to u through a chain, where a chain is
defined as an acyclic directed path originating from any starter
transaction and ending at address u.
Loop of an address u, Ou is the number of starter transactions
which are connected to u with more than one directed path.
Rationale: Our graph features are designed to quantify specific
transaction patterns.
Loop is intended to count how many transaction i) split
their coins; ii) move these coins in the network by using
different paths and finally, and iii) merge them in a single
address. Coins at this final address can then be sold and
converted to fiat currency (see Figure 7 in [25] for examples
of such patterns).
Weight quantifies the merge behavior (i.e., the transaction
has more input addresses than output addresses), where coins
in multiple addresses are each passed through a succession of
merging transactions and accumulated in a final address (see
aggregations in Figure 1 of [17] for a potential application of
this pattern).
Similar to weight, the count feature is designed to quantify
the merging pattern. However, the count feature represents
information on the number of transactions, whereas the weight
feature represents information on the amount (what percent of
these transactions’ output?) of transactions.
Length is designed to quantify mixing rounds [24] on Bit-
coin, where transactions receive and distribute similar amounts
of coins in multiple rounds with newly created addresses to
hide the coin origin (see the mixing rounds in Figure 2 of [33]).
Example 1 (Graph Features): Consider the toy network in
Figure 1. We begin from defining the starter transactions TX =
{tx1, tx3, tx4, tx5} as in this specific window, they receive no
coins from an earlier transaction.
We assign each of the four transactions a weight of 1,
regardless of their output amounts Ao(.). Addresses a1 and
a2 receive Wa1 = 1/|Γotx1 | = 1/2 and Wa2 = 1/|Γotx1 | = 1/2
from transaction tx1, respectively. Address a3 receives 1/2 of
the weight from a1. Hence, Wa3 = (1/2)×(1/2). Consider a10
which receives weights from tx3 and tx4. Weight of tx3 flows
through a5 and t6, whereas the weight of tx4 flows through a7
and tx7 to reach a10. Hence, Wa10 = Wa7 + [Wa5 +Wa6 ] =
(1/2) + [1/2 + 1/2].
Length of a1 and a2 is 0, but La3 = La4 = 1, since a4 and
a5 can be reached from tx1 through a non starter transaction
tx2. Furthermore, a10 can be reached from tx3 or tx4, hence
La10 = 1. Although a8 and a9 appear later than a3 and a4,
lengths of a8 and a9 are shorter, because these addresses are
direct outputs of the starter transaction tx5.
The address a10 has three chains: i) tx3 → a5 → tx6 →
a10, ii) tx4 → a6 → tx6 → a10 and tx4 → a7 → tx7 → a10,
but these chains start from three starters only (i.e., tx3 and
tx4). Hence, its count Ca10 = 2.
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Transaction tx4 has two chains that reach a10 through tx6
and tx7, separately. These two chains form a loop from tx4
to a10. Hence, Oa10 = |{tx4}| = 1. All other nodes have zero
loops.
Feature Standardization. In data pre-processing, we use
feature standardization to make the values of each feature
have zero-mean and unit-variance. We first compute mean and
standard deviation for each feature and subtract the mean from
each feature value. Then we divide each feature value by its
standard deviation.
B. Ransomware address classification and clustering
Before detailing our TDA model, in this section we first
outline four classification and clustering models that we em-
ploy in this paper.
Similarity Search:
We use addresses contained in a specific time window
t, and compute pairwise similarity to known ransomware
addresses from the last l days.
Heuristics
Following two heuristics that are defined by Meiklejohn et
al. [26] are used in our experimental evaluation.
Co-spending: “If two addresses are inputs to the same trans-
action, they are controlled by the same user”.
Transition: “If we observe one transaction with addresses A
and B as inputs, and another with addresses B and C as inputs,
then we conclude that A, B, and C all belonged to the same
user”.
We did not implement the change heuristic proposed in
[26], because addresses discovered by the change heuristic are
not guaranteed to belong to the same user.
Unsupervised approaches
DBSCAN density clustering: Density-based spatial clustering
of applications with noise (DBSCAN) is a density-based non-
parametric clustering algorithm. DBSCAN can mark outlier
points that lie alone in low-density regions as noise [11].
Hierarchical clustering: We use k-means clustering with
Forgy algorithm based initial seed selection [13].
Tree based approaches
Extreme Gradient Boosting Trees (XGBT): applies gradient
boosting algorithms to decision trees [6].
Random forest is a supervised ensemble of multiple simple
decision trees to estimate the dependent variables of the
data [16].
C. Topological Data Analysis Models: TDA Mapper
In this project we introduce the concepts of topological
data analysis (TDA) into detection of ransomware patterns on
Blockchain. The fundamental idea of TDA is to extract hidden
data patterns via systematic analysis of data shapes such as,
cycles and flares, quantified at various resolution scales [5],
[21].
TDA offers the following multi-fold benefits which are
particularly useful in the context of ransomware detection.
First, TDA assesses data shapes in a coordinate-free manner,
which implies that we can systematically compare patterns
of data obtained under various data collection frameworks.
Second, TDA analyzes properties of data shapes that are robust
to minor data perturbations. Hence, TDA tends to deliver more
consistent results on hidden data patterns even under noisy
data collection schemes which is a typical scenario in money
laundering studies. Finally, TDA offers a low dimensional de-
scription of some key properties of the high-dimensional data
by using a finite combinatorial object for systematic extraction
of data shape patterns. In this paper, we employ the Mapper
method of [35], [5] which is a highly customizable TDA tool
allowing for a systematic multi-resolution glimpse into organi-
zation and functionality behind the underlying data generating
process. By complementing more traditional clustering and
projection pursuit approaches with a systematic insight on data
geometry and topology, Mapper often recovers hidden data
patterns that are otherwise inaccessible with conventional data
analytic techniques.
The key idea behind Mapper is the following. Let U be
a total number of observed addressed and {~xu}Uu=1 ∈ RD
be a data cloud of address features. Select a filter function
ξ : {~xu}Uu=1 → R.
Let I be the range of ξ, that is, I = [m,M ] ∈ R, where
m = minu ξ(~xu) and M = maxu ξ(~xu). Now place data into
overlapping bins by dividing the range I into a set S of smaller
overlapping intervals of uniform length, and let uj = {u :
ξ(~xu) ∈ Ij} be addresses corresponding to features in the
interval Ij ∈ S. For each uj perform a single linkage clustering
to form clusters {ujk}.
To find the number of clusters, Mapper analyzes empirical
distribution of edge lengths at which each cluster is merged
based on the rationale that internal distances (i.e., within a
cluster) are expected to be lower than external distances (i.e.,
in-between clusters) and distributions of internal and external
distances are disjoint. Let {ujk} be addressed in the k-th
cluster of the j-th interval. View each cluster as a node and
draw an edge between two nodes k and m if clusters {ujk} and
{ulm} contain overlapping addresses, i.e., {ujk}∩{ulm} 6= ∅.
As a result, Mapper produces a low dimensional represen-
tation of the underlying data structure in the form of ”cluster
tree” graph CT where each ”cluster” is a branch of some single
connected component rather than a disconnected component
on its own as in conventional clustering analysis. In Fig. 2,
we show an example of the produced Mapper graph. Each
node may contain three sets of addresses: past ransomware
addresses, past non-ransomware addresses, and addresses of
the current time window, whose labels are unknown. If current
addresses are contained in clusters that also contain many
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Fig. 2: Mapper graph of the Cerber ransomware addresses
(2017 day 307), filtered with the length attribute. Around
clusters we indicate the number of past ransomware addresses
contained in the cluster. We show total order (i.e., address
count) of two biggest clusters inside circles (326 and 537).
The two clusters with 19 past ransomware addresses (top left)
contain 53 and 67 addresses. Clusters without past ransomware
are depicted in yellow.
past known ransomware addresses, we deem these current
addresses potential ransomware addresses.
We filter the TDA mapper graph of using each of our
six graph features. As a result, we obtain six filtered graphs
CT 1, . . . , CT 6 for each time window. Afterwards, we assign
a suspicion, or risk score to an address au, as outlined in
Algorithm 1.
input : A set of networks CT 1, . . . , CT D; filter
threshold q; inclusion threshold 1; size
threshold 2; set of past ransomware addresses
RS; set of past non-ransomware addresses
NRS .
output: A set of suspicious addresses.
P : Map← Initialize scores of all l addresses with 0;
foreach network CT ∈ {CT 1, . . . , CT D} do
foreach cluster Cc ∈ CT do
Ac ← select all addresses in Cc;
V ← Ac ∩RS;
if |V | ≥ 1 × |RS| then
if |Ac| ≤ 2 × |CT .V | then
foreach au ∈ Ac \ {RS ∪NRS} do
Pu ← 1 + Pu;
qt ← quantile(P, q);
S = {∀au ∈ P |Pu ≥ qt};
return S;
Algorithm 1: TDA filtering with multiple attributes.
Algorithm 1 starts by computing the number of past
Fig. 3: Address recurrence in days. 11 addresses have more
than 120 appearances (omitted here).
ransomware addresses in each cluster. If both inclusion and
size thresholds, 1 and 2, respectively, are satisfied, addresses
in the cluster have their suspicion scores incremented.
Parameters. We use two parameters to control what we
learn from mapper clusters: inclusion and size parameters.
The inclusion parameter 1 limits what can be learned when
very few ransomware addresses are contained in the cluster.
The size threshold 2 prevents learning when cluster includes
too many addresses. Such phenomenon usually happens if a
filtering feature does not exhibit a sufficiently discriminating
performance during a specific time window, and all addresses
are lumped together. For example, in Figure 2 the largest
cluster contains 78 past ransomware addresses. Given this
finding and the cluster size of 537 addresses, the risk scores
of the remaining 459 addresses are to be elevated – that is,
the procedure results in testing of too many addresses as
potentially suspicious. We further use a quantile threshold q on
addresses, and label addresses suspicious only if they are in the
top 1−q of all addresses. We emphasize that by controlling q,
1 and 2 parameters, we can avoid making predictions when
evidence of past ransomware is not sufficiently strong.
We will denote TDA models with the TDA1|2q nota-
tion. TDA models may deliver nested results; for example
TDA0.5|2q may return the same set of suspicious addresses
as TDA0.7|2q results. For such cases, we prefer the most
restrictive model; i.e., the model with the highest q, highest
1 and lowest 2.
In summary, the key benefit of the Mapper approach is
its capability to recover hidden similarities (i.e., connections)
between these ”clusters”, or groups of addresses, that are
typically unavailable with traditional clustering techniques.
V. RANSOMWARE BEHAVIOR
Dataset. We have downloaded and parsed the entire Bitcoin
transaction graph from 2009 January to 2018 December. Using
a time interval of 24 hours, we extracted daily transactions on
the network and formed the Bitcoin graph. We filtered out
the network edges that transfer less than B0.3, since ransom
amounts are rarely below this threshold. As mentioned in
Sec. VII, in final verification we used the full graph to discover
smaller amounts that we may have missed due to this filtering.
Our ransomware dataset is a union of datasets from three
widely adopted studies: Montreal [30], Princeton [17] and
Padua [8]. The combined dataset contains 24,486 addresses
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from 27 ransomware families. From these addresses, we extract
the features listed in Tab. XI. The column N shows the number
of times addresses from a given family appear in the Bitcoin
blockchain. The unique column gives the number of unique
addresses for each family. In 24 ransomware families, at least
one address appears in more than one 24-hour time window.
Fig. 3 shows a histogram of appearances. CryptoLocker has
13 addresses that appear more than 100 times each. The
CryptoLocker address 1LXrSb67EaH1LGc6d6kWHq8rgv4ZBQAcpU appears for a
maximum of 420 times. Four addresses have conflicting ran-
somware labels between Montreal and Padua datasets. APT
(Montreal) and Jigsaw (Padua) ransomware families have two
and one multisig addresses, respectively. All other addresses
are ordinary addresses that start with ’1’.
A. A summary on ransomware features
TABLE I: Most common 6 feature value combinations (i.e.
patterns) in ransomware addresses. Address column gives the
number of addresses with the pattern. Rank of a pattern
is computed over all (ransomware or not) addresses in the
blockchain. Difference in ranks of ransomware and non-
ransomware patterns is found statistically significant by two-
sample Wilcoxon rank sum test [4], p-value < 2.2× 10−16.
Length Weigth Neighbor Count Loop Income #Address Rank
0 0.5 2 1 0 B1 327 1
0 0.5 2 1 0 B1.2 250 113
0 1.0 2 1 0 B1 189 4
0 1.0 1 1 0 B0.5 178 9
0 0.5 2 1 0 B0.8 160 116
0 1.0 1 1 0 B1 146 3
0 1.0 2 1 0 B1.2 127 121
0 0.5 2 1 0 B1.25 119 327
0 0.5 1 1 0 B0.5 118 6
0 1.0 1 1 0 B2 117 18
We compute six feature values of 48,168 ransomware
address appearances. We find 30K unique feature values (i.e.,
unique rows of data), which we term patterns. Table I lists the
top 10 most frequent patterns in ransomware address features.
Here, 54 of the top 100 most frequent patterns of all addresses
are also found in the top 100 of ransomware patterns. The Rank
column shows the rank of a pattern in all transactions. We find
that four of the top-10 ransomware address patterns do not
appear in the top-100 patterns of all addresses. Furthermore,
length=0 implies that ransomware addresses receive payments
from starter transactions; in the given window, such addresses
have no past history. Finally, weight 0.5 implies that the starter
transaction pays the ransomware address, and uses a change
address. We also find that a ransomware address typically
receives all coins of the transaction, i.e., weight=1.0.
Table XI shows mean values of the graph features for ran-
somware addresses. CryptoLocker, CryptXXX, Locky, Cerber,
DMALockerv3 and CryptoWall have more than 100 unique
addresses. The Razy ransomware exhibits an outlier behavior
in five features. In weight, only DMALocker has a value
> 1. WannaCry family is an outlier in both length and
loop features. Figure 4 depicts distributions of two features,
count and loop. When compared to non-ransomware addresses,
ransomware addresses exhibit more profound right skewness
in distributions of feature values.
B. Feature Relevance for ransomware behavior
We compute feature values for each appearance of ran-
somware addresses, and visualize the six-dimensional feature
data in Fig. 5 for the six largest families. Each data point is
given a location in a two-dimensional map by the t-stochastic
neighborhood embedding [22]. We show results for three
perplexity values; perplexity “can be interpreted as a smooth
measure of the effective number of neighbors” [22]. Distances
and sizes may not be meaningful in TSNE, however, groups
of data points exhibit interesting patterns. Each family can be
seen to have small groups of co-clustering addresses, implying
that a few addresses have similar features. As perplexity
increases, we find that addresses tend to cluster together, with
DMALocker and CryptXXX addresses appearing at the center.
CryptoWall and CryptoLocker addresses appear together in
many groups. The most important insight to be gained from
TSNE results is that addresses from a ransomware family
do not all exhibit the same behavior – each family have a
multitude of patterns that repeat across addresses.
C. Ransomware behavior similarity
We use ransomware labels as external ground truth, and
cluster ransomware addresses in up to 20,000 clusters. We
compute cluster purity for each family, which we define
as the percentage of addresses from a family appearing in
clusters where every address in the cluster belongs to the same
ransomware family. In computing purity, we only consider
clusters that contain more than one data point. Fig. 6 depicts
purity for the eight biggest ransomware families by address
count; Cerber CryptoWall and CryptoLocker reach almost 40%
purity. As in Fig. 6, we find an optimal number of k = 12500
clusters.
Next, we analyze the resulting clusters for relationships
between ransomware families. In Tab. II, we show the number
of clusters that are shared by ransomware pairs. CryptoWall
addresses appear in 1152 pure clusters (all addresses belong to
CryptoWall). CryptoLocker and CryptoWall addresses appear
in 2587 impure clusters. In Tab. III, we further look into
these shared clusters and count how many addresses are co-
clustered in families. We see that 5122 CryptoLocker addresses
(1st row, 2nd column) are clustered with 4826 CryptoWall
addresses (2nd row, 1st column). From Tab. III, we again see
that CryptXXX more often co-clusters with CryptoLocker. The
case of CryptoLocker-CryptoWall is intriguing; CryptoLocker
addresses cluster more often with CryptoWall addresses than
with other CryptoLocker addresses.
In August 2014, the CryptoLocker ransomware was taken
down by Operation Tovar: a consortium constituting FBI,
Interpol, security software vendors and several universities.
Two months earlier, the CryptoWall ransomware had been
discovered. CryptoLocker spread through email attachments,
whereas in addition to attachments, CryptoWall uses kits
hosted on compromised websites or malicious ads. CryptXXX
appeared in April 19, 2016.
Clustering uses address features that encode transaction be-
haviors of two set of users: initial ransom payers, and hackers
that move paid ransom amounts on the network. As initial pay-
ers are unknown to each other, we do not expect them to exhibit
similar behavior. We believe that the similarity implied by the
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(a) Count distribution in ran-
somware addresses.
(b) Count distribution in non-
ransomware addresses.
(c) Loop distribution in ran-
somware addresses.
(d) Loop distribution in non-
ransomware addresses.
Fig. 4: Distributions of feature values for ransomware and non-ransomware addresses. Ransomware addresses are skewed for
both features. The skew also exists in weight and length features (not shown here).
Fig. 5: Two dimensional t-Stochastic Neighbor embeddings for addresses from six ransomware families. The perplexity can be
interpreted as a measure of the effective number of neighbors to be considered for each point.
Fig. 6: Clustering ransomware addresses by using six features.
clustering results can only be due to shared hacker behavior.
As such, CryptoLocker, CryptoWall and CryptXXX may be
created and run by the same hackers. As a supporting evidence,
for CryptXXX, the security company Symantec warns that
“Definitions (of the detection tool) prior to September, 2016
may detect this threat as Trojan.CryptoLocker.AN”) [38] (We
could not find such a note for other ransomware families).
D. Address features over time
In our detection and prediction problems, we assume that
ransomware addresses exhibit similar feature patterns in time,
and we can learn to identify these patterns. However, the TSNE
results in Sec. V-B show that a global behavior may not exist.
TABLE II: Number of shared clusters between ransomware
families (k = 12500). At least one address of the ransomware
in row is co-clustered with at least one address of the ran-
somware in columns. If more than two families exist in a
cluster, the cluster is counted for each pair.
Crypto Crypto Crypt Noob DMA
Wall Locker Cerber Locky XXX Crypt Locker
CryptoWall 1152 2587 976 1403 374 304 129
CryptoLocker 690 1220 841 379 142 99
Cerber 647 493 562 18 20
Locky 296 266 87 55
CryptXXX 49 24 5
NoobCrypt 6 28
DMALocker 2
TABLE III: Number of co-clustering addresses from ran-
somware families (k = 12500).
Crypto Crypto Crypt Noob DMA
Wall Locker Cerber Locky XXX Crypt Locker
CryptoWall 3145 5122 1737 3015 624 702 321
CryptoLocker 4826 1766 2380 1843 618 238 179
Cerber 3415 2285 1885 9763 1696 22 37
Locky 4077 3023 1512 832 460 405 384
CryptXXX 1024 1077 1467 355 155 52 5
NoobCrypt 344 164 18 95 25 12 37
DMALocker 140 107 21 61 6 33 4
In fact, when we compute ransomware patterns, Tab. IV shows
that only 10 families have feature patterns that are repeated
in time (see Tab. I patterns). For example, Cerber has 3491
addresses use 564 unique patterns more than once. Some of
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these pattern repeating addresses appear in hundreds of time
windows: the address 1LXrSb67EaH1LGc6d6kWHq8rgv4ZBQAcpU appears in 420
windows. We cluster it in 66 clusters multiple times (as given
in Sec. V-C); in one cluster it appears six times. Overall,
100 addresses from CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, NoobCrypt,
DMALockerv3, GlobeImposter, DMALocker and CryptXXX
families have repeating patterns in time. These results offer
evidence that although we cannot talk of a general behavior,
small groups of addresses from at least 10 families can be used
to discover other ransom addresses.
TABLE IV: Repeating patterns in ransomware transactions.
Ransomware Unique pattern # addresses
Cerber 564 3491
Locky 403 2704
CryptoWall 389 1406
CryptoLocker 248 1201
CryptXXX 141 1018
DMALockerv3 19 56
Globev3 3 7
DMALocker 3 6
GlobeImposter 1 2
NoobCrypt 1 2
VI. RANSOMWARE DETECTION AND PREDICTION
In this section we first discuss two factors that we account
for in training our models.
Class imbalance. Compared to 24,486 known ransomware ad-
dresses from 2013 to 2018, there exist 200K daily transactions
on average on the Bitcoin network, where each transaction
contains an average of 5 input and output addresses. As a
result, we observe a large number of f0 (i.e, non-ransomware)
addresses, leading to a class imbalance problem in classi-
fication. To reduce class imbalance, we train on a limited
number of addresses; that is, we employ N ∈ {300, 600, 1000}
samples of f0 and f1, . . . , fn (i.e., ransomware) addresses
each. Our choice is due to the fact that on most days we
observe much fewer than 100 unique ransomware addresses.
Temporal variation. Ransomware families appear and dis-
appear in certain time periods. For example, the Cryp-
toLocker ransomware was active until 2014 September. Al-
though its clones, such as CryptoWall, appeared afterwards,
using CryptoLocker addresses in training for later days may
increase false positives. To mitigate these effects, we em-
ploy a sliding window approach, and use data from last
l ∈ {30, 60, 90, 120, 240} windows to train our models.
Metrics. For each model and ransomware family, we compute
precision and recall by using overall sums of TN, FN, FP and
TP values across multiple time windows. Precision and recall
are computed as TP/(TP + FP ) and TP/(TP + FN), re-
spectively. As we observe considerably more non-ransomware
addresses, we identify the positive likelihood ratio (PLR =
TP/FP ) as an important metric, since PLR quantifies the
effort needed for analyzing the blockchain by using model
prediction results. For example, a PLR of 1 implies that for
every TP address, the analyst has to manually analyze one FP
address, unnecessarily.
Parameters. In all models, we report the optimal parameters
that maximize F1 scores in predictions as follows: In DB-
SCAN, we experimented with  = 0.05, . . . , 1 values. Random
Forest uses ntree=500 and mtry=|Xt| /3. XGBoost uses the
gbtree booster and nrounds = 25. For TDA computations,
we use the TDAMapper RStats package (https://github.com/
paultpearson/TDAmapper) with parameters overlap=40, inter-
val = 80.
A. Existing family detection
We outline our experimental settings for the detection
problem as follows.
Given features and known labels of past addresses Xt, Yt
at time t and features of addresses Xt′ at time t′ > t, we train
for existing ransomware family detection as follows:
1) Select a ransomware family rs whose new addresses will
be detected at time t′.
2) For t < t′, use a training length l, and create a dataset Xt
which holds features and labels of addresses observed between
times t− l and t.
3) Create an f0 sample of size N from X0[t−l,t] ⊆ X[t−l,t]
without replacement where ∀xu ∈ X0[t−l,t], yu = f0 and N =∣∣∣X0[t−l,t]∣∣∣.
4) Create a ransomware sample of size N from Xrs[t−l,t] ⊆
X[t−l,t] without replacement where ∀xu ∈ Xa[t−l,t], yu = frs
and N ≤
∣∣∣Xrs[t−l,t]∣∣∣.
5) Using the ground truth data at t′, find all ransomware
addresses for t′: Xrst′ .
6) Using the ground truth data at t′, take a sample of M =
1000 white (i.e., f0) addresses without replacement: X0t′ .
7) Remove past known addresses from Xrst′ , i.e., X
rs
t′ ←
Xrst′ \Xrs[t−l,t].
8) Use features {X0[t−l,t] ∪ Xrs[t−l,t]} and labels {Y 0[t−l,t] ∪
Y rs[t−l,t]} as the training data, and classify {X0t′ ∪Xrst′ }.
We emphasize four aspects of existing family detection: i)
[Step 7]: from the test dataset we remove appearances of
addresses that have appeared in the past (i.e., t < t′), because
their labels are already known. ii) [Step 4]: If an address
appears in multiple windows, its each appearance will have
(potentially) different features in X[t−l,t] with the same rs
label. iii) [Step 7]: On many days, we will not have N past
rs addresses to train from. iv) Most importantly, we learn a
model for each ransomware family. In our experiments, we
show that these models do not share the same characteristics.
Heuristics. By employing the co-spending and transition
heuristics with all past history (i.e., N = |Xt|, and l =∞), we
discover only 40 unique addresses from CryptoLocker (Padua),
CryptoWall (Padua), CryptoTorLocker2015 (Montreal), Cryp-
toTorLocker2015 (Padua) families.
Naive similarity search. An interesting benchmark for detect-
ing undisclosed payments from existing families is to compute
the similarity of Xt′ addresses to the past addresses in Xt.
If existing families exhibit repeating patterns over time, the
similarity search can match new addresses to known ransom
addresses. In fact, Fig. 7 shows that this strategy may be
effective. By using exact matches to known ransom patterns
of the past, in six days similarity search reveals more than 50
addresses each day, while predicting a maximum of 73 false
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Fig. 7: Ransomware detection with exact feature matches.
positives on 2013 day 336. These results offer supporting evi-
dence of utility of our features. However, this naive approach
creates 21,371 FP addresses overall, which makes it unfeasible
for operational use by security analysts.
TABLE V: Existing family address detection results.
RS Method l N TP FP FN TN #w Prec Rec F1 PLR
Locky TDA.8|.5.9 240 300 451 2350 50 8221 11 0.161 0.900 0.273 0.192
COSINE 90 300 2395 41681 3990 146369 194 0.054 0.375 0.095 0.057
Crypto TDA.8|.65.9 240 600 217 3087 155 11200 15 0.066 0.583 0.118 0.070
Wall DBSCAN.2 240 600 728 18960 794 16913 59 0.037 0.478 0.069 0.038
Crypto TDA.65|.65.9 240 300 439 9686 212 22129 34 0.043 0.674 0.081 0.045
Locker DBSCAN.15 60 300 935 42771 295 11316 67 0.021 0.760 0.042 0.022
Cerber TDA.5|.35.9 120 300 187 5174 459 23027 29 0.035 0.289 0.062 0.036
XGBOOST 240 300 1606 47307 7279 374169 436 0.033 0.181 0.056 0.034
Crypt TDA.35|.35.9 90 300 77 2460 271 11057 14 0.030 0.221 0.053 0.031
XXX COSINE 30 600 589 20872 610 42952 65 0.027 0.491 0.052 0.028
Table V shows the main results of our models. For each
ransomware family, TDA has a hyper-parameter set that pro-
duces the best model. However, these parameter values are
not the same across families. Sample size (N ) and training
length (l) parameters are different as well. For each family,
we also provide the best non-TDA model for comparison. The
Locky ransomware has the best results with a precision of
0.161 and recall of 0.9. In general, models yield better recall
than precision. In Table V, #w is the number of windows
where a model makes at least one label prediction. By using the
q, 1 and 2 hyper-parameters, TDA models avoid predicting
labels when level of confidence in the derived classification is
low.
Similar to TDA, DBSCAN can ignore data points in
clustering; two of the best non-TDA results are delivered
by DBSCAN models. In the best TDA models for each
ransomware family, we predict 16.59 false positives for each
true positive. In turn, this number is 27.44 for the best non-
TDA models.
As TDA models appear to be sensitive to the selected
hyper-parameters, we turn our attention to these values. For
increasing threshold values, recall decreases from 0.53 (q =
0.0) to 0.37 (q = 0.9), but precision and PLR values do not
change. In Figure 8, we present model performance for 1 (i.e.,
threshold on how many past ransomware addresses should be
contained in the cluster) and 2 (i.e., threshold on at most
how many addresses the cluster can contain). As Figure 8
indicates, TDA models tend to be more sensitive to 2 values.
By limiting 2 to small values, we reach higher precision on
average. However, this leads to fewer predictions, as 2 defines
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Fig. 8:  parameters in all TDA models (the filter threshold
q = 0.9).
at most how many data points can be grouped together (see
sec. IV-B).
Our results indicate that making predictions in every time
window may not be desirable, as it leads to lower F1 values.
Both TDA and DBSCAN can ignore some data points, thereby
making predictions only when enough data exists. As we
can control the sensitivity of TDA models through hyper-
parameter selection, a natural question is to ask whether more
restrictive settings should be preferred in TDA. Figure 9
depicts TDA performance when settings allow for lower (i.e.,
fewer windows) or higher (i.e., more windows) sensitivity.
Precision, recall and F1 values are averaged for TDA models.
We find that less sensitive models yield higher precision, but
lower recall values. Cerber results show the greatest change
in terms of sensitivity, whereas Locky has the best and most
stable results. For some families, such as CryptXXX, the
least sensitive models deliver the highest precision values.
These findings imply that some TDA models are able to make
predictions for very few windows only, but the results can be
very accurate.
B. New Family Prediction
We outline our experimental settings for the detection
problem as follows. Given features Xt and known labels Yt of
past addresses at time t and features of addresses Xt′ at time
t′ > t, we train for discovering addresses belonging to new
ransomware families as follows:
1) For t < t′, use a training length l, and create a dataset
X[t−l,t] ⊆ Xt which holds features of addresses observed
between windows t− l and t.
2) Create an f0 sample of size N from X0[t−l,t] ⊆ X[t−l,t]
without replacement where ∀xu ∈ X0[t−l,t], yu = f0 and N =∣∣∣X0[t−l,t]∣∣∣.
3) Create a ransomware sample of size N from Xrs[t−l,t] ⊆
X[t−l,t] without replacement where ∀xu ∈ Xrs[t−l,t], yu 6= f0
and N ≤
∣∣∣Xrs[t−l,t]∣∣∣.
4) Relabel all addresses in Y rs[t−l,t] with the label fr.
5) By using the ground truth data at t′, take a sample of
M=1000 white addresses without replacement to be used in
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Fig. 9: Performance of TDA models with increasing sensitivity. Sensitive models can make predictions for every window.
the testing phase: X0t′ .
6) By using the ground truth data, choose a family rs′ whose
emergence at t′ will be discovered.
7) By using the ground truth data at t′, find all ransomware
addresses for t′ to be used in the testing phase: Xrs
′
t′ .
8) Use features {X0[t−l,t] ∪ Xr[t−l,t]} and labels {Y 0[t−l,t] ∪
Y r[t−l,t]} as the training data, and classify {X0t′ ∪Xrt′}.
We emphasize two aspects in predicting a new family: i)
[Step 4]: in training, addresses of all existing families are
relabeled with fr, thereby creating a unified ransomware class,
ii) [Step 8]: when an address is predicted as ransomware, we
cannot immediately claim that it constitutes a new family, or
belongs to an existing family.
As our current goal is to predict new ransomware families
without any prior information about these families, the training
task has to learn a single model that will be used to identify
all future ransomware families. Using our models, we forecast
emergence of 25 ransomware families. Emergence of the first
ransomware, CryptoLocker, cannot be predicted, because we
have no prior ransomware data to train a model for Cryp-
toLocker.
The best model, TDA0.05|0.350.7 uses N = 1000 past samples,
l = 120 training length, and predicts TP = 26, FN =
8, TN = 5032, FP = 21075. The model predicts 25 emerging
ransomware families, but also results in 810.57 false positives
for each true positive.
We hypothesize that this unsatisfactory performance is due
to data scarcity; among the 25 families, only three families
have more than one address in their first window on the Bitcoin
blockchain. These families are DMALockerv3 (2016 day 233),
Flyper (2016 day 335) and eRanger (2016 day 68).
TABLE VI: Day/Year pairs in the discovery experiment.
Ransomware First window Used window #Unique address
Cerber 62/2016 89/2016 16
CryptXXX 132/2016 133/2016 38
DMALocker 7/2015 34/2016 14
CryptoWall 59/2014 64/2014 22
Locky 42/2016 47/2016 59
We now repeat the forecasting experiment by considering
the earliest window when a ransomware yields 10 or more
addresses. Such filtering results in a dataset of five ransomware
families. We exclude the previously observed addresses of
these families from our training set. The first and the identified
earliest windows for each family are presented in Table VI.
Time difference in windows is as small as one for some
families.
TABLE VII: Model performance for new family prediction.
Method Training size N Training length l PLR
TDA0.2|0.20.9 300 60 0.21085470
COSINE 300 60 0.04232920
DBSCAN0.2 300 60 0.02802958
RANDOMFOREST 300 60 0.00000000
XGBOOST 300 60 0.00000000
Despite improving data scarcity, Table VII shows that tree
based methods (i.e., Random Forest and XGBoost) fail to
predict any ransomware family. Table VIII shows predicted
values for each family. We find that three TDA models tend
to deliver the best F1 results for all five families. In addition
to TDA models, we show one competing result from other
models for each family. Overall, in three families TDA has
the highest PLR value. For DMALocker, the best models are
DBSCAN-based ones. Unlike existing family detection, in new
family prediction we value finding an address with the fewest
false positives. In this aspect, we reach the best result for
CryptXXX, where a TDA model predicts one true positive and
one false positive. With the best models provided in Table VIII,
on average we predict 27.53 false positives for each true
positive in forecasting of new ransomware families.
However, we emphasize that for some families, such as
CryptXXX, our models predicts only two ransomware ad-
dresses, one of which is a true positive. This result offers
evidence that our prediction models can be highly effective
for certain families of ransomware.
Model parameters in prediction. Table IX shows average
model performance across five ransomware families for dif-
ferent q values in TDA models. As the threshold increases,
we observe slightly higher precision and lower recall values.
Figures 10 and 11 depict PLR and recall values for each family.
Overall, families exhibit better results for smaller training
lengths (i.e., l) and larger sample size (i.e., N ) values. This
implies that ransomware addresses change features in time,
and using a long history does not always result in better model
performance.
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TABLE VIII: Results for new ransomware family prediction
(l = 60, N = 300).
RS Method Prec Rec TN FP TP FN PLR
CryptXXX TDA0.2|0.20.9 0.500 0.026 917 1 1 37 1.0
COSINE 0.046 0.342 654 264 13 25 0.049
Locky COSINE 0.098 0.138 795 37 4 25 0.108
TDA0.05|0.950.9 0.047 0.586 489 343 17 12 0.049
CryptoWall TDA0.05|0.950.9 0.0625 0.500 810 165 11 11 0.067
TDA0.35|0.80.9 0.061 0.500 805 170 11 11 0.0647
Cerber TDA0.05|0.950.9 0.029 0.214 849 100 3 11 0.030
TDA0.35|0.80.9 0.023 0.642 570 379 9 5 0.023
DMALocker DBSCAN0.2 0.019 0.875 120 367 7 1 0.019
DBSCAN0.15 0.015 0.875 4 459 7 1 0.015
TABLE IX: Mean values of metrics for the filter threshold in
TDA models across five families.
q PLR Precision Recall TP
0.0 0.028 0.0264 0.664 15.25
0.3 0.028 0.0266 0.635 14.61
0.5 0.029 0.0278 0.589 13.75
0.7 0.031 0.0298 0.515 12.15
0.9 0.035 0.0319 0.352 8.35
Fig. 10: Model parameters and performance values across best
models of the five ransomware families.
VII. ADDRESS ELIMINATION
As a final step in our ransomware prediction, we employ
three filtering approaches on the results produced by the best
models in the existing family detection task.
Setting. To this end, we use the best TDA models outlined
in Table V with N = 300, l = 60, and classify addresses in
the last 30 days of each ransomware family. This task results
in 72 days, where we can forecast and test the predictive per-
formance. CryptoLocker, CryptXXX, DMALocker, Cerber and
Locky have 2, 20, 1,19 and 20 days’ predictions, respectively.
In these forecasting tasks, 3,211 addresses have been labeled
Fig. 11: The impact of training size across best models of the
five ransomware families.
as suspicious (potential ransomware), whereas only 92 of them
are true ransomware addresses.
Shape Elimination. We hypothesize that ransomware transac-
tions can be divided into two types: front and mixing. Front
transactions are initial payments made by ransomed entities.
Mixing transactions are created by hackers to transfer and sell
received coins to other addresses. The ransomed entities buy
bitcoins from exchanges or bitcoin users to pay hackers. These
transactions are N-to-1 (i.e., in a transaction that has N input
addresses and one output address, all coins are gathered in one
address) or N-to-2 (i.e., a remaining amount is further directed
to a change address) transactions. In this setting, depending on
how many bitcoins are bought, N can be as high as 15000.
If we focus on detecting front payments only, we hypoth-
esize that number of ransomware labeled addresses can be
further reduced. On the complete Bitcoin blockchain, 91.06%
of all transactions are N-to-1 or N-to-2 transactions. Of the
24198 known ransomware addresses in our dataset, 20826
(86.06%) have at least one appearance that receives coins in an
N-to-1 or N-to-2 transactions. Of the 3,211 addresses, we find
that 861 (26.8%) can be filtered out. However, 16 of the 92 true
ransomware addresses are also filtered out. Shape elimination
results in 2,350 suspicious addresses and 76 ransomware
addresses.
Graph Elimination. Once ransom is received, hackers can sell
each ransom coin to a different buyer (address) individually.
This approach makes ransomware address detection particu-
larly challenging. However, in most cases transaction costs
discourage this privacy enhancing approach, and coins are
merged and sold together in a single transaction. For example,
Huang et al. [17] found that coins of Cerber family were
continuously merged, and the resulting large tree of addresses
was easily identified by the researchers.
We hypothesize that the small distance between an address
to known past ransomware addresses can help us to be more
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Fig. 12: Distance of ransomware labeled (suspicious) addresses
and all addresses to known ransomware addresses. Suspicious
addresses are closer to known ransomware. Difference of the
two distributions is statistically significant as indicated by
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [20] with D = 0.29564, and p-value
< 2.2× 10−16.
confident in its label designation. We measure the distance in
a breadth first search as the number of edges on the shortest
path to a known ransomware address. Figure 12 depicts the
distribution of 666 addresses which are reachable from the
known past virus addresses on the graph. Here, 8 of the 92 true
ransomware addresses are contained in these 666 addresses.
Furthermore, the 8 unique addresses were at most 4 hops away
from known ransomware addresses.
Figure 12 indicates that among all addresses that are reach-
able from the known ransomware addresses, the suspicious
addresses tend to be located noticeably closer. Mean and
median distance values of suspicious nodes to ransomware
nodes are x¯ = 2.44, x˜ = 3, respectively, with a maximum
distance of 7 hops. If we use a maximum distance of 4 or less
hops, only 617 addresses remain. Graph elimination hence
results in 617 suspicious addresses and 8 true ransomware
addresses.
Corroborating evidence: In all ransomware families, we
record 324 addresses that are found to be suspicious in multiple
time windows. In maximum, 3 addresses appear in 6 time
windows each. All 324 addresses survive shape elimination,
whereas only 158 addresses survive graph elimination. In
total, we find 350 unique suspicious addresses and 8 true
ransomware addresses after graph and shape eliminations.
Multisig elimination. Bitcoin contains multiple types of ad-
dresses. In the simplest case, an ordinary address is controlled
by a single private key. These addresses start with the character
’1’ such as 1LXrSb67EaH1LGc6d6kWHq8rgv4ZBQAcpU. A second address type,
multisig address, requires more than one key to authorize a
Bitcoin transaction. Multisig addresses start with the character
’3’ such as 3NQoq5MVPfEMw12gB4a2c1G61mRZyMymsB. These addresses are usu-
ally used to divide up responsibility for possession of bitcoins.
For the first usage, as ransomware payments involve a payer
and a payee who may not trust each other, we advocate that
multisig addresses cannot be used in ransomware payments.
A second usage is to prevent coin theft: users can create
a multisig transaction where they own all the addresses, but
private keys are stored on different machines. In such schemes,
coins can only be stolen if all machines are compromised,
which makes the theft very difficult. Hackers could potentially
use multisig addresses to avoid theft of ransomed coins.
Though, we believe that such a scenario is currently very
rare, since only three addresses with multisig are found among
the more than 24K known ransomware related addresses. Of
course, this heuristic may not be effective in the future, if
ransomware operators start using more multisig addresses.
Out of the 358 suspicious address, 339 are ordinary ad-
dresses; these addresses start with ’1’. Hence, our multisig
elimination round ends with 8 true ransomware, and 331
suspicious addresses.
Our elimination results show that many addresses are
found suspicious in multiple time windows. Furthermore, such
addresses survive all graph, chainlet and multisig eliminations.
Our results offer strong evidence that these suspicious
addresses are indeed ransomware related.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new data analytics based
framework to detect and predict ransomware transactions that
use Bitcoin. Using a topological data analysis based approach
and novel blockchain graph related features, we empirically
show that we can significantly improve the ransomware re-
lated Bitcoin address detection accuracy compared to existing
heuristic based approaches. Furthermore, we show that by
using certain address elimination heuristics, we can reduce the
number of suspicious addresses that need to be analyzed by
the cyber security analysts.
As a future work, we plan to combine our proposed ap-
proach with other methods (e.g., running the ransomware to get
additional seed addresses) and threat intelligence information
(e.g., reports about the emergence of new ransomware) to
increase our prediction accuracy.
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